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Introduction 
 
Term limits are a relatively new occurrence in the United States, and although 
there have been numerous studies conducted on how term limit legislation affects 
legislatures, legislative behavior, and the career path of legislators; there has been very 
little work completed to analyze the effect of term limits on state legislatures’ approval 
ratings.  This is a significant oversight in that representative democracy rests in some 
notion that lawmakers and lawmaking ought to reflect the desires (or interests) of the 
voters.  If voters create term limits but are also dissatisfied with the performance of their 
legislative bodies, then some breakdown has occurred in the decision making process.  
The research presented in this paper will review the history of term limit legislation, 
viewpoints of term limit advocates, existing scholarly studies and their conclusions in 
regards to term limit legislation.  This scholarship will be employed to identify the 
important control variables selected for this analysis.  Finally, the paper presents original 
findings for the effect of term limits upon states’ approval ratings of their State 
legislatures utilizing a multivariate linear regression model. 
In 1990 three states enacted legislation placing term limits on their state 
legislators, and since that time term limit legislation has been passed in 18 additional 
states.  Six of these twenty-one states that enacted term limit legislation have seen it 
repealed; leaving fifteen states with active term limit legislation.  The State Supreme 
Courts repealed the legislation in four states and the other two had it repealed in their 
state legislatures.   
Career politicians in state legislatures are a relatively new phenomenon in the 
United States.  Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell’s (2004) analysis of term limits and 
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legislative turnover rates illustrates that until the 1950’s the crisis in state legislatures was 
not career politicians, it was exactly the opposite; a lack of continuity due to new 
members in each legislature creating an atmosphere characterized by a lack of 
professionalism and a general weakness in the decision making process.  A study 
conducted by Charles Hyneman (1938) found that some state legislatures had more than 
fifty percent new members in each session.  The professionalization of state legislatures 
during the twentieth century led to a decline in the voluntary retirement of legislators.  
This decline coupled with the incumbency advantage experienced at the polls has 
produced longer serving state legislators.  By the late 1980’s many citizens had become 
largely dissatisfied with long serving legislators who they felt were no longer 
representative of the population, unresponsive to public interests, and becoming more 
associated with special interests and elites.  For many, including the Republican Party, 
the response to this dilemma was term limits.  The term limit movement in the late 
1980’s and 1990’s was in large part a strategy by the Republican minority to unseat 
entrenched Democrats.  Term limits became one of the tenets of the “Contract with 
America” which the Republicans endorsed in 1994, and much of the funding came from 
tax-exempt organizations subsidized by the Republican Party (Powell 2008).  Democrats 
controlled 59% of the seats in the U.S. House and 56% of the seats in the U.S. Senate in 
1992, and had controlled both U.S. Legislative branches for 47 of the last 53 years.  The 
Democrats also held 59% of all state legislative seats and controlled 68% of all legislative 
assemblies.  The Republican Party was the clear minority party in 1992, while receiving 
50% of the popular vote, and they recognized term limits as a way to unseat longtime 
incumbent Democrats (Campbell 1996).   
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 Robert Kurfirst’s (1996) analysis of term limit supporters illustrates major 
differences in advocates’ views of incumbency, professionalism, and the role of a 
legislator’s relationship with his/her constituents.  Term limit advocates see term limits as 
a “cure-all” for all that is wrong with state legislatures.  But do they really make 
legislatures more like what their constituents want them to be?  Are people in term limit 
states more satisfied with their legislatures?  Robert Kurfirst (1996) explains differences 
in supporters’ views by categorizing believers into four categories; progressives, 
populists, republicans, and libertarians. 
Term limit progressivism has its roots in the Progressive Movement of the early 
1900’s.  The Progressive Movement sought to initiate “good government” practices with 
the implementation of the recall, referendum, and citizen initiative.  Term limits were not 
part of the original Progressive Movement because legislators did not serve long terms, 
and because it was believed that the shorter terms of politicians were directly associated 
with the corruption of the urban machines and unskilled state legislatures.  Therefore the 
Progressive Movement sought not to limit “time of service,” but actually to increase it.  
They felt that a more professional legislature would eliminate much of the corruption that 
existed in the political relationships of the time.  Term limit progressives acknowledge 
that the professionalization of legislatures has back fired.  They believe that legislators 
today are more concerned with elites and special interests in the hopes of re-election than 
the interests of their constituents.  
Term limit populism also aspires for more responsive and efficient legislatures. 
The Populist faction views professionalism and careerism as obstacles to good 
government, and thus seeks to install more “ordinary citizens” into the legislature.  
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Populists believe that only with the influx of new amateur legislators can we recapture a 
degenerated government that has become too concerned with re-election and the welfare 
of special interests and elites.  Kurfirst (1996) likens these term limit supporters to the 
Anti-Federalists of the late 1700’s.  Today’s populist movement generally prefers more 
stringent term limits than the ones currently imposed, usually to a single term. 
Term limit republicanism rejects the ideas of the progressive and the populist 
claiming that term limits are necessary not to increase citizen-legislator relationships, but 
to distance legislators from constituents.  Republicanism maintains that term limits will 
eliminate careerism, thus enabling legislators to better negotiate policy that is for the 
good of the general community.  A central contention of republicanism is that in order for 
legislators to enact good policy they must be free from the pressure of re-election.  Term-
Limit Republicans consider term limits essential in the transformation of legislators into 
“trustees” insulated from public demands, elites, and special interests. 
Term limit libertarians consider term limits an indispensable part of a larger 
strategy to reduce the size of government.  Libertarians believe that term limits are but 
one step in the reduction of staffs, budgets, and expenditures.  They are in favor of 
shortening legislative sessions, lowering legislator salaries, and reducing legislator 
benefits.  Term limit libertarians regard term limits as necessary to eliminate the “culture 
of spending” they perceive as leading to the demise of the nation.  I believe that Kurfirst 
would closely associate term limit libertarians with today’s Tea Party Movement. 
Although each separate faction supporting term limit reform has its distinct 
differences, they all share one common belief; limitations on length of service will reduce 
elitism and the over-representation of special interests.  Progressivism, populism, and 
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liberalism share the view that term limits will reduce careerism and thus reduce 
professionalism.  While government reformers argued for the professionalization of 
legislatures, this, ironically appears to be negatively associated with approval ratings 
(Kelleher and Wolak, 2007; and Squire, 1993).  
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Term limits and state legislatures 
  Political scientists and government reformers have mostly been proponents of 
professional legislatures and are opponents of term limits.  Political scientists are 
concerned that the average citizen does not possess the ability to hold public office and 
term limits will deplete capable leadership that is already in short supply (Petracca 1992).  
Many scholars have investigated the effects of term limits on various aspects of state 
legislatures; their work, their membership, and their effectiveness. 
Much scholarly work has been carried out to analyze the effects of state 
legislative term limits on legislator turnover.  Francis and Kenny (1997) projected that 
legislative term limits would produce 35-50% turnover rates in State legislatures; loading 
the assemblies with inexperience and discontinuity.  Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell (2004) 
provide empirical data to confirm that term limited states are seeing a larger increase in 
turnover than non-term limited states, but not to the degree earlier predicted.  Building on 
the pioneering work of Schlesinger (1966), Black (1972), and Kiewiet and Zeng (1993) 
many scholars (Farmer and Powell, 2003; Heberlig and Leland, 2004; Caress, 1996; 
Powell, 2000; Steen, 2006; and Maddox 2003) are now analyzing the career choices of 
term limited politicians and what Francis and Kenny (2000) term the churning effect.  
Contrary to the expectations of the progressive, populist, and libertarian advocates for 
term limits seeking a less professional legislature Farmer and Powell (2003) find in their 
study of Maine and Ohio that 45% of politicians who have been termed out of office have 
simply moved into other political offices.  They note that this development should be 
troubling to term limit advocates “As experienced politicians circulate through political 
office, there may actually be less opportunity for citizens without prior elective 
7 
 
experience to win office.  Instead of heralding the end of long-term political careers, we 
may instead simply be witnessing the emergence of new kinds of careers.”  Nine States’ 
term limit legislation bans “consecutive terms” which enables politicians to rotate 
through different offices while still seeking a political career.  The six States that impose 
lifetime bans see the “churning effect” but not to the extent of the other term limited 
States.   
Another argument proposed by term limit advocates was that term limits would 
increase voter turnout.  Kimberly Nalder (2007) building on the work previously cited 
analyzed California, district level voting data from 1974 to 2004 and found no support for 
this claim.  Nalder’s findings illustrate that open seat races at the state level in California 
have risen since 1994 and continue to remain at a high level, but California’s U.S. 
Congressional open seated elections which also rose in 1994 have returned to their 
previous levels.  It was believed that these open seated elections would increase 
competition and thus increase voter turnout (Basham, 2001; Basham and Polhill, 2005; 
and Francis and Kenney, 1997).  It was also believed that the influx of new candidates 
would indirectly restore confidence in the government thereby increasing voter turnout.  
Nalder concluded that the results or her pooled-time series regression analysis could 
produce no evidence that the open seated races in California created an increase in voter 
turnout.  And though she did not attempt to correlate any relationship of government trust 
with term limits she did conclude that if term limits did indirectly increase political trust, 
that trust did not increase voter turnout.   
Weissert and Halperin (2007) use logistic regression to analyze survey results 
from fifty nine party chairs and 1,060 lobbyists in Florida.  Their analysis focuses on 
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party chairs and lobbyists because they observe the effects of term limits on state 
institutions first hand.  The results of their study found that the more knowledgeable and 
attentive chairs and lobbyists were the more likely they were to oppose term limits or 
support their repeal.  Their analysis found that chairs and lobbyists were not opposed to 
term limits because of “self interest” but out of concern for the institution and the harm 
term limits could cause.  Term limit advocates would dispute this claim, and as a result 
use the fact that because chairs and lobbyists are opposed to term limits they must be 
correct. 
In opposition to the findings of Weissert and Haplperin (2007), Kelleher and 
Wolak (2007) present data that shows term limits to be a statistically significant factor in 
citizen’s confidence levels of representatives in the State legislatures, but the variable is 
omitted when analyzing confidence in the institutional processes of the State legislature. 
The research conducted for this paper concentrates on the effect of term limits on the 
institution of State legislatures not legislators.  Kelleher and Wolak’s (2007) data 
illustrate that 17% of people surveyed have a great deal of confidence in state 
legislatures, 57% have some confidence, 18% only have a little confidence, and 8% have 
no confidence at all.  It is unclear the specific difference between approval ratings and 
confidence levels, but the analysis of the 1,867 individuals surveyed in the data set used 
by Kelleher and Wolak (2007) was the foundation for the hypotheses presented in this 
paper. 
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Approval ratings and the economy 
Economic conditions are among the “usual suspects” when it comes to explaining 
just about everything in state politics.  For example, there have been numerous studies 
completed documenting the importance of economic conditions as they relate to voting 
behavior in presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial elections but very little research 
completed analyzing economic conditions data and voting behavior at the State level, and 
even less research evaluating the affects the condition of the State economy may have on 
State legislature/legislator approval ratings.  It is for this reason that a review of the 
literature illustrating the statistical significance of the economy on voting behavior for 
incumbents was included.  Kramer’s (1971) analysis of the short-term fluctuations in 
voting behavior, and more specifically, effects of unemployment, per capita real income, 
and incumbency as it related to congressional elections from 1896-1964 was based on a 
multivariate model wanting to overcome some of the perceived weaknesses and 
difficulties in the earlier studies of (Downs, 1957; Key, 1966; Kerr, 1944; Pearson and 
Myers, 1948; and Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960).  Kramer found, as did 
Key (1966), that economic conditions had a significant effect on congressional elections, 
with the incumbent benefiting from an economic upswing, and his opponent benefitting 
from an economic downturn.  Arcelus and Meltzer (1975) found no appreciable 
significance in aggregate economic conditions on voter behavior, and suggested that 
important swings arose from voter participation and not voter shift between parties.  
Bloom and Price (1975) sought to reconcile this dispute of findings by defining long-run 
and short-run economic forces; they defined their independent variables as party 
affiliation and economic conditions, and their dependent variable as voter behavior.  They 
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proposed to examine the causal relationship between economic conditions and voting 
behavior as it related to party affiliation.  The hypothesis was that as economic conditions 
worsened, a voter would be more likely to cast his ballot for the non-incumbent party’s 
candidate.  Bloom and Price (1975) conducted multiple time-series and cross sectional 
analyses and found that economic down-turns reduced the vote for an incumbent, but 
economic upturns had no corresponding positive effect.  Additional findings include the 
same  results for both Democratic and Republican administrations, no measurable 
difference in voter turnout, and voters primarily considered changes relevant only in the 
last year; these seem to explain methodology errors in the previous work of Stigler 
(1973), and Arcelus and Meltzer (1975).  These results of the afore mentioned studies of 
conflicting data helped lead Fiorina to evaluate the “economic retrospective voting 
theory”. 
  Fiorina’s analysis of economic retrospective voting theory attempted to answer 
the question, “does the incumbent administration prosper in good times and suffer in bad 
times?”  Fiorina (1978) used data collected from the national election surveys (1956-
1974) which were conducted by the University of Michigan, Survey Research Center and 
found support at the presidential election level for this theory.  However, when this 
theory was applied to congressional elections Fiorina found no support, a finding that was 
later reinforced by the findings of Kinder and Kiewiet (1979).  Using the independent 
variables; do you see your personal financial situation as better, same, or worse? and 
party affiliation, Fiorina found that in 26 of 30 cases those who perceive their situation as 
same or better voted for the incumbent.  Fiorina’s study of egocentric (personal) 
evaluations rather than socio-tropic (national) evaluations, has led to numerous works 
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over the past 30 years that have provided a wealth of information concerning voter 
behavior, macroeconomics, and personal finances.  Socio-tropic evaluations have been 
found to have a much more significant impact on voter choice in presidential elections 
(Abramowitz and Ramseh, 1988; Kiewiet, 1983; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981; and Kramer, 
1983).  To further clarify socio-tropic and egocentric voting behaviors, Abramowitz and 
Ramseh (1988) attempted to answer the questions of how voters evaluate economic 
information and how they assign causal responsibility for personal changes in financial 
circumstances.  Their results strengthened the previous cases made by Lau and Sears 
(1981), Feldman (1982), and Brody and Sniderman (1977), that few individuals assigned 
changes in their personal financial situation to macroeconomic conditions.  Abramowitz 
and Ramseh (1988) found that there was a significantly strong relationship between voter 
behavior and perceptions of the national economy, especially when the individual’s 
personal financial condition was concurrent with that of the economy.  However, when 
the individual’s personal financial condition differed from the national economy they 
found no strong relationship between voter behavior and incumbency.  This is consistent 
with the findings of Erikson (1989) who formulated a multivariate model using Tufte’s 
(1978) measure of net candidate advantage with Hibb’s (1987) measure of income 
change.  Erikson extended the time series to include presidential elections from 1948-
1984 and found a .92 correlation of events.   
Chubbs (1988) analyzed national and state economic data from 1942-1982 in an 
effort to explain their effects on voting behavior in Governor and State legislative 
elections.  The findings in his analysis show that the national economy is a better 
predictor of vote choice in governor and state legislative elections than is a state’s 
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economic performance.  He concluded that while a state’s economic performance is 
significant in a governor’s race, the standard error is much too large to be of value 
especially in the wake of the large magnitude of the national indicator, and the state 
legislative evidence is even weaker.  Stein (1990) presents 1982 gubernatorial survey 
data which shows that 25.4% of respondents blame the president for a state’s economic 
condition, 18.4% blame the president and the governor, and only 15.4% blame the 
governor.  The results of Stein’s regression analysis support the findings of Chubb in 
evaluations of gubernatorial elections.  State economic conditions are significant but pale 
in comparison to the effects of national economic conditions.  Stein did find with greater 
significance that voters who had assigned blame for the state’s economy to governors did 
vote retrospectively for incumbent governors supporting the findings of Fiorina (1978).  
Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel (1995) hypothesize that state economic policies and their 
implications are significant in gubernatorial voting, especially in regards to tax policies.  
In a retrospective voting model they analyzed 1986 voting data and found with statistical 
significance that states which did not raise taxes were 13% more likely to vote for either 
the incumbent governor or the incumbent governor’s party candidate if the incumbent 
was not seeking re-election.  Svoboda (1995) employs voter’s perceptions of the state’s 
economy to analyze those effects on 1982 and 1986 gubernatorial elections.  His findings 
are more significant than that of earlier studies which he attributes to his methodology.  
Svoboda claims it is the perceptions of the voters that matters and not the aggregate 
economic data of previous studies.  Svoboda’s results of the analysis of the 1982 and 
1986 data show that after party affiliation the voter’s perception of the state’s economy is 
the most important predictor of vote choice followed by the voter’s perception of the 
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president.  Stein (1990), Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel (1995), and Svoboda (1995) each 
stress that the increased significance of state economic conditions and policies on 
gubernatorial elections in their research is directly related to the increased role of state 
governments in recent years and the elimination of older data.   
Richard Nadeau and Michael Lewis-Beck (2001) acknowledged that the national 
economy had a substantial effect on voting behavior, and in their comprehensive study 
attempted to clarify the significance of that affect as it correlates to different economic 
indicators, retrospective evaluations, prospective evaluations, the role of institutions, and 
subjective or objective measures.  Nadeau and Lewis-Beck analyzed American National 
Election Studies from 1956-1996 to correlate the relationship between voting behavior 
and national economic conditions then they proposed a National Business Index (NBI) 
based on data from the Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior, University of 
Michigan; which asked if business conditions were worse, same, or better than one year 
ago in several categories.  Individuals will weigh unemployment, GDP, inflation, and 
other variables differently so this assessment more accurately defines the voter’s 
perception of the economy.  They found this measure to be more statistically important 
than any single indicator.  Nadeau and Lewis-Beck also proposed an Economic Future 
Index (EFI) by combining survey results from several different questions.  Much like the 
NBI this data was aggregated into one variable.  This data was also gathered from the 
Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior, University of Michigan.  The data analysis 
produced coefficients roughly equal in size to that of the analysis using the NBI, and 
appeared equally important in determining voter behavior.  After further evaluation, they 
contended that the NBI and retrospective voting is more significant in election years with 
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an incumbent presidential candidate than election years without an incumbent.  The 
second finding from their analysis is that the EFI and prospective voting was more 
significant in election years without an incumbent candidate.  In 2012 political scientists 
continue to study and debate the most accurate model for economics and voting behavior; 
one can hardly disagree with the fact that the condition of the economy has a direct causal 
effect on voter behavior.  It is because of the magnitude of this evidence that an indicator 
of economic conditions must be used as a control variable.   
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Approval ratings and professionalism 
 Jewell (1982) illustrates the difficulties associated with political research at the 
state level noting that the conversion of theory into practice is extremely complicated, yet 
there are a growing number of political scientists endeavoring to explain causal 
relationships between the professionalism of State legislatures and legislator turnover, 
policy making capacity, and citizen approval ratings.  The subject of how to measure the 
professionalism of a state legislature is one of these problems.  Squire (2007) details that 
the first indices were created by John Grumm (1971) and the Citizens Conference on 
State Legislators (1971) both to measure legislative policy making capacity, and since 
that time alternative measures for various purposes have been developed Berkman 1993; 
Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000; Bowman and Kearney 1988; Carey, Niemi, 
and Powell 2000; King 2000; Moncrief 1988; and Morehouse 1983.  Thompson and 
Moncrief (1992) acknowledge that while the definition of professionalism may differ 
slightly, most professionalism studies include compensation, days of service, and staff 
support as the three main components of their indices.  Squire’s index is unique in the 
fact it measures these three components of State legislatures and compares them to the 
U.S. Congress.  A perfect resemblance with the U.S. Congress would score a 1.0, while 
no resemblance would score a 0.0 (Squire, 2007).  King (2000) states “These properties 
make Squire’s procedure superior to others for assessing changes in professionalism in 
State legislatures.”   
Squire (1993) analyzed data from the 1989 University of Iowa Social Science 
Institute’s Heartland Poll to correlate, among other things, the relationship between State 
legislatures’ professionalism and citizen’s opinions of their legislatures.  The data 
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included 1,610 cases from seven states.  Responding to voter’s sentiment of the early 
1990’s Squire (1993) hypothesized that approval ratings of State legislatures would be 
negatively correlated with legislative professionalism.  As an example he cited that 
California voters had cut resources available to legislators for the third time in six years.  
The legislative reforms which were supposed to create a more professional legislature 
and an atmosphere of better representation had not succeeded.  But was the 
professionalism of the legislature to blame?  To answer this question Squire developed 
his index of professionalism to measure the institution not the individual legislator, and 
made a seminal decision to compare the three components to the U.S. Congress.  Squire 
found with statistical significance that professionalism was negatively correlated with 
approval ratings.  Other findings concluded that support for the legislature was 
independent of age, income, and education.  Minorities support the legislature less than 
non-minorities, and rural residents support the legislature more than urban residents.  
Squire concluded that his findings could be a result of the most professionalized 
legislatures being located in the most populated states with the most economic and 
socially diverse residents.   
Building on the work of King (2000), Kelleher and Wolak (2007) analyzed data 
from 1, 826 respondents in all fifty States gathered by the National Center for the State 
Courts to correlate the confidence levels of citizens with the courts, governors, and state 
legislatures.  Kelleher and Wolak’s analysis showed a statistically significant, negative 
correlation between citizen’s confidence level in their State legislature and the 
professionalism of the State legislature.  The “state legislature” sample of 1,704 
respondents included 17% who said they had a great deal of confidence, 57% who had 
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some confidence, 18% with only a little confidence, and 8% with no confidence at all.  
The p value of professionalism in their multilevel ordinal logit estimates was -.497 with a 
standard error of .146.  This evidence supported the previous findings of Jewell (1982), 
Squire (1993), and King (2000).     
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Approval ratings and Congress  
 Congressional approval ratings emerge from a reward-punishment model 
(Ramirez, 2009).  Scholarly research has shown that economic growth increases public 
approval of Congress and economic downturns decrease public approval of Congress 
(Stimson, 2004; and Rudolph, 2002).  Another key independent variable in the 
fluctuation of the approval ratings of Congress is “Presidential Approval”.  Patterson and 
Caldeira (1990) show a statistically significant relationship between the Presidential 
approval rating and the approval rating of Congress.  As the President’s approval rating 
rises so does the approval rating of Congress.  Conversely, as the President’s approval 
rating drops so does the approval rating of Congress.  Recent scholarly research that 
analyzes the relationship between Congressional approval ratings and partisan conflict 
has demonstrated mixed results.  Fiorina, Abrahms, and Pope (2005) find no significant 
relationship between Congressional approval ratings and partisan conflict.  While 
Ramirez (2009) finds that there is a statistically significant relationship between the two.  
The limited amount of research conducted concerning Congressional approval ratings is 
in large part due to the lack of consistent data making a reliable measure hard to acquire.   
Ramirez (2009) illustrates this point, citing that Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht (1997) 
“use over 300 administrations of over 40 different surveys items regarding public 
evaluations of Congress and extract a single latent dimension.”        
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Term limits and public approval 
 In the sections above, I have briefly discussed the extant scholarship that 
addresses either directly or indirectly public approval of state legislatures.  While term 
limits have been widely studied and typically instituted by voters, very little attention has 
been given to whether voters are happy with what they wrought.  If voters wanted term 
limits and then put them in place, shouldn’t they be happier with the work of their 
legislatures than they were prior to the imposition of term limits?  Or, might voters in 
term limit states be happier with their legislatures than voters in other states who may 
want term limits but don’t have them?  At base, the question is important because it 
speaks to an essential question of representative democracy.  Legislatures are meant to 
“represent” the state.  If term limits improve that relationship (as advocates expected 
them to do) then that should be evident from public approval.  
 In the remainder of this paper I will build a model predicting public approval of 
state legislatures.  I am primarily interested in the relationship between term limits and 
public approval.  Other factors will also be incorporated into the discussion but these will 
be treated as controls in the empirical analyses. 
Given my review of the limited scholarship on public approval of state 
legislatures and the U.S. Congress, I have developed two hypotheses regarding term 
limits and State legislatures’ approval ratings. 
1. Term limit states will have higher approval ratings for their legislatures than 
States without term limits will have for their legislatures. 
2. Term limit states will have lower disapproval ratings for their legislatures than 
States without term limits will have for their legislatures. 
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The first hypothesis incorporates approval ratings as the dependent variable.  This  
is consistent with the previous scholarly research on professionalism (Squire, 1993; King, 
2001; and Kelleher and Wolak, 2007).  The dependent variable in hypothesis 2, 
disapproval rate, was derived from the literature review of economics and voting 
behavior.  Specifically retrospective and prospective voting, retrospective voting research 
(Bloom and Price, 1975; Fiorina, 1978; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981; Kramer, 1983; and 
Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001) has shown that negative economic results punish 
incumbents.  Applying that reasoning, I believed it was possible that even if term limits 
did not affect approval rating in a positive direction they could lower disapproval ratings.    
The dependent variable in my study is the public approval of state legislatures.  
Unfortunately, as is often the case in state politics research, a measure of this important 
concept across the states remains elusive.  A thorough investigation of existing surveys 
assessing the approval ratings of State Legislatures met with limited success.  Although 
no comprehensive surveys including all fifty States were discovered; I found that two 
separate institutions have conducted surveys in eleven States.  The combination of these 
results produced 270 cases spanning nine years.   
The 270 cases evaluated have independent variables that represent one state with 
a lifetime ban (TLife), two states with consecutive bans (TConn), two states in which 
term limits were repealed by the State Supreme Court (RC), and six states that have never 
tried to enact term limit legislation (NTL).  Appendix 1displays the listing of each State, 
its term limit status, the number of cases utilized in this study, and the span of time in 
which the surveys were conducted.  As stated in the first hypothesis I expect term limits 
to have a positive coefficient indicating that states with term limits will be more likely to 
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approve of their legislature than states without term limits.  Conversely, as stated in 
hypothesis 2, I expect term limits to have a negative coefficient indicating that states with 
term limits will have a lower disapproval rate of their legislatures than states without term 
limits.   
The literature detailed above has shown with statistical significance that economic 
conditions, professionalism, and party identification influence approval ratings or levels 
of confidence in elected officials, be it State legislatures, or the U.S. Congress.  The 
literature also revealed that two other variables could be significant in my analysis; 
whether a legislature was in session, and divided government.     
 The economic measure used for this analysis needed to reflect not only the 
difference in economic conditions of each State; it also had to reflect economic changes 
on a monthly basis.  An impartial measure was found in the monthly unemployment 
numbers for each State.  These numbers were obtained from the U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  I would expect this variable to have a negative 
coefficient in the regression analysis of approval rate, and a positive coefficient in the 
regression analysis of disapproval rate.  This would indicate that as unemployment rises a 
state legislatures’ approval rating will decrease and its disapproval rating will increase. 
There has been a considerable amount of scholarly debate in recent years about 
how to measure professionalism in a State’s legislature.  The following summation of the 
difficulties in measuring legislature professionalism is taken from Squire (2007) and 
illustrates the problems associated with the three components most often used in the 
indexes.  Most professionalism indices use legislator salary as the sole indicator of the 
compensation measure, but there are unvouchered reimbursements, health insurance 
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coverage and pension plans which could be considered.  The difficulties of obtaining all 
such measurements make it nearly impossible to include them in the legislator’s salary.  
Rosenthal (1996) disputes the belief that salaries should be included in the index at all 
because they are not an institutional measure.  Squire (2007) details the difficulties 
measuring the second component, legislative session length, because it is reported in two 
different ways; calendar days or legislative days.  There are also special sessions and 
perfunctory business which could be considered.  The final component in the indices, 
staff support, is difficult because it is measured in three ways by the NCSL, and difficult 
to find or not available in years the NCSL did no surveys.  The lack of this information 
has led Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman (2000), Carey, Niemi, and Powell (2000), 
and Moncrief (1988) to use annual budget numbers for a State legislatures as a 
replacement.  After a careful analysis of each method; it was decided that the index used 
for this variable would be coded using Squire’s Index of State Legislature 
Professionalism revised in 2003.  This measure is expected to correlate negatively with 
approval rate and positively with disapproval rate (Squire, 1993; King, 2001; and 
Kelleher and Wolak 2007), indicating that as a state legislature becomes more 
professional the voters will approve of it less and disapprove of it more.   
At the onset of this research it was believed that party identification could affect a 
state’s approval rating of its legislature.  The review of the existing literature pertaining 
to economics and voting substantiated this belief, especially in the research of 
gubernatorial elections (Stein, 1990; and Svoboda, 1995).  I have no theoretical reason to 
expect a particular relationship between party and public approval, but it is included as a 
control variable in order to build a more complete model.      
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The legislative session length for each State differs greatly.  Some of the State 
legislatures evaluated in the model meet year round; while others meet every other year, 
or for just a few months.  Because it is more likely that state legislative news will be 
printed in newspapers and broadcast on television and radio programs during these 
legislative sessions this variable was included.  I don’t attempt to correlate how many 
times a story was in the media or measures of good news or bad news; only that the 
legislature was in session.  It is expected that this variable will have a negative correlation 
to approval rate and a positive correlation to disapproval rate because if a state legislature 
is not in session usually there will be no press coverage of legislative activities to 
influence approval ratings. 
Divided government was added as the final control variable.  The information 
used to compile this variable was gathered from previous research conducted by Margaret 
Ferguson, Indiana University, Indianapolis.  Divided government is often used as a 
control variable in gubernatorial and congressional approval rating research.  The 
expectation is that divided government will have a positive coefficient, indicating that if a 
state has a divided government the approval ratings will be higher, and if it does not the 
disapproval ratings will be higher.    
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Empirical analysis 
 The unit of analysis in this research is the State, and at the heart of the 
investigation is “Do states with term limits have higher approval ratings of their state 
legislatures than states without term limits? And conversely do states with term limits 
have lower disapproval ratings for their state legislature than states without term limits?”  
STATA was used for the regression analysis and all variables were coded as follows. 
Dependent Variables.  The dependent variables in my study are the approval rates of state 
legislatures and the disapproval rates of state legislatures.  As was previously stated a 
measure of this important concept across the states remains elusive.  Although no 
comprehensive surveys including all fifty States were discovered; Survey USA has 
conducted monthly surveys in California, Oregon, Washington, and Kansas; and 
Quinnipiac University has conducted monthly surveys in New York, Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, Ohio, Connecticut, Florida, and Virginia.  In each poll the respondent was asked 
if he/she approved, disapproved, or was unsure of the way the State legislature was 
handling its job.  The combination of these results produced 270 cases spanning nine 
years.  Each case has a minimum of 600 respondents and a sampling error of less than 
4%.  This information was coded into three separate variables; ARate for the percentage 
of respondents in a state who approved, DRate for the percentage of respondents in a 
state who disapproved, and URate for the percentage of respondents in a state who were 
unsure. 
Independent Variable.   
Term limits are the primary independent variable of interest in this study.  The 
term limit data for each State was obtained from the National Conference of State 
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Legislators and coded 1 for yes a state has term limits in effect, and coded 0 for a state 
has no term limits in effect.  The 270 cases evaluated here represent one state with a 
lifetime ban, two states with consecutive bans, two states in which term limits were 
repealed by the State Supreme Court, and six states that have never tried to enact term 
limit legislation.  As stated above, I expect term limits to have a positive coefficient with 
dependent variable 1 indicating that states with term limits will be more likely to approve 
of their legislature than states without term limits.  Conversely, as stated in hypothesis 2, 
I expect term limits to have a negative coefficient with dependent variable 2 indicating 
that states with term limits will have a lower disapproval rate of their legislatures than 
states without term limits.   
Control Variables.   
I am primarily interested in the effects of term limits on state legislature approval 
but the previous research detailed above has shown with statistical significance that 
multiple variables must be included in the analysis of the approval and disapproval 
ratings of state legislatures.  The linear regression conducted in this research utilizes 
measures for these variables to structure a more complete model.  Every effort was made 
to obtain each of these measures from one source.  I was successful for all variables 
except in the case of party identification, which required two sources.  Control variables 
outlined above and included in this analysis consist of professionalism, economic 
conditions, party identification, whether the legislature is in session, and divided 
government.     
Professionalism.  There is some disagreement on how best to measure 
professionalism. After considering the existing research, I decided Squire’s Index of State 
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Legislature Professionalism revised in 2003.  This measure, “ProLeg”, was used for each 
State in all years analyzed.  I expect this variable to have a negative coefficient for 
approval rating and a positive coefficient for disapproval rating in the regression analysis.  
This would indicate that as previous research has demonstrated (Squire, 1993; King, 
2001; and Kelleher and Wolak, 2007) the more professional a legislature becomes the 
lower the level of approval, and the less professional a legislature becomes the higher the 
approval rating. The disapproval rate should work conversely, the higher the level of 
professionalism the higher the disapproval rate and the lower the level of professionalism 
becomes the lower the level of disapproval rate becomes.  This is an important distinction 
between previous research in that Squire (1993) and Kelleher and Wolak (2007) did not 
attempt to correlate disapproval ratings with professionalism. 
Economic Indicator.  As was previously stated the economic measure used for 
this analysis needed to reflect the difference in economic conditions of each state and it 
also had to reflect economic changes on a monthly basis.  An impartial measure was 
found in the monthly unemployment numbers for each State.  These numbers were 
obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The variable, 
“UnEmRate”, is coded at the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for each case.  
Based on the previous research outlined above this variable is expected to correlate 
negatively to approval rate, positively to disapproval rate.  Positive economic conditions 
should work in favor of public approval of legislatures while negative economic 
conditions should detract from it.   
Party Identification.  Three measures were developed using annual political 
leanings of a State’s residents as surveyed by the Gallup Institute and the Pew Research 
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Center.  The first variable, “Rep”, coded for this annual measure is percent Republican or 
leaning Republican, the second variable, “Dem”, is percent Democrat or leaning 
Democrat, and the third, “SPID” is coded as the percent of respondents who answered 
Democrat or leaning Democrat minus the percent of respondents who answered 
Republican or leaning Republican.  Each case was coded for this annual variable 
regardless of the month in which the approval survey was conducted.  The direction of 
correlation for this variable was not predicted prior to the initial correlation, but was 
included in the analysis to measure any consequential affect it may have in the linear 
regression model.    
In Session.  The legislative session length for each State differs greatly.  Some of 
the State legislatures evaluated in the model meet year round; while others meet every 
other year, or for just a few months.  Because it is more likely that State legislative news 
will be printed in newspapers and broadcast on television and radio programs during 
these legislative sessions this variable was included.  Squire (1993) found no statistical 
significance for this variable when included in his study but he was working with annual 
data, and it is not included in the research of Kelleher and Wolak (2007).  I don’t attempt 
to correlate how many times a story was in the media or measures of good news or bad 
news; only that the legislature was in session.  This information was obtained from the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, and the variable, “InSess”, was coded 1 for the 
legislature being in session and 0 for the legislature not being in session.  It is expected 
that this variable will have a negative coefficient in the regression analysis of approval 
rate indicating that if a legislature is in session the approval rate will be lower than for 
legislatures not in session.  The variable is predicted to have a positive coefficient in the 
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regression analysis of disapproval rate indicating that if a state legislature is in session the 
disapproval rate will be higher than the disapproval rate of a state legislature that is not in 
session. 
Divided Government.  The information used to compile these variables was 
gathered from previous research conducted by Margaret Ferguson, Indiana University, 
Indianapolis.  The first variable, “DivLeg”, was coded 0 if each House of the State 
legislature was controlled by the same Party, and 1 if each House was controlled by 
different Parties.  The second variable, “DivGov”, was coded 0 if both Houses were 
controlled by the same party as the Governor, and 1 if there was any divide between the 
Governor and either House.  The third variable, “DivLG”, for divided government is 
coded 0 if both houses of the State legislature are controlled by the same party as the 
Governor’s Party, it is coded 1 if both houses of the State legislature are controlled by the 
same Party but it is different from the Governor’s Party, and coded 2 if each house of the 
State legislature is controlled by a different party.  The expected correlation of these 
variables in the regression analysis is positive for approval rate and negative for 
disapproval rate.  
 Methodology.  Following the formulation of the hypotheses, and the gathering of 
pertinent data, a correlation analysis was generated to inspect the possible relationships 
between the independent variables and the two dependent variables.  The results of these 
correlations are available for inspection in Appendix 2.  Term limits, professionalism, 
unemployment, and in session correlated as predicted.  There appeared to be interaction 
between the two categories “Rep” and “Dem” and the two categories “DivLeg” and 
“DivGov”; for this reason the variables “SPID” and “DivLG” were chosen for the 
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regression model.  “SPID” and “DivLG” both correlate in a positive direction to 
“ARate”, and negatively to “DRate”.  To adjust standard errors and any unexplained 
variance in the regression analysis the data was clustered on an independent variable, 
“Fips”, the Federal Information Processing Standard.  This standard was used to assign a 
unique coding number for each of the eleven states in the analysis.  The unit of analysis 
for this research was “States” and all correlations and multivariate regression models 
were produced in Stata. 
Analysis 
Table 1 illustrates the findings from the clustered multivariate regression. Term 
limits, professionalism, and unemployment are statistically significant at .001 and all 
traveled in the predicted direction.  Divided government and party identification are 
significant at .01, and again traveled in the predicted direction.  The only variable that is 
not significant is in session.  The term limit results are impressive, holding all 
independent variables at their mean, states with term limits are nearly 10% more likely to 
approve of their state legislature than states without term limits.  The R-squared value 
rose from .510 in the regression without the term limit variable; to .672 with the term 
limit variable included.  As expected States with term limit legislation are more likely to 
approve of their State legislatures than are States without term limit legislation.    
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Table 1.  Summary of Linear Regression Results 
                     Approval Ratings of State Legislatures   
  R-Sq. = .672     
    Robust   
 
Coefficient S.E.   
Term limits 9.317*** 1.538   
Professionalism -32.073*** 5.039   
Unemployment -1.961*** 0.263   
Divided Government 2.853** 0.781   
In Session 0.227 1.102   
State Party ID 0.227** 0.065   
Constant 46.636*** 2.330   
        
260 Observations, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
 Table 2 illustrates the findings from the second clustered multivariate regression, 
this one using the disapproval rate dependent variable. In this regression term limits, 
professionalism, and unemployment were statistically significant at the .001 level.  
Divided government slipped slightly to a p value less than .01 and in session was 
statistically significant at the .05 level.  The term limit results are even more impressive 
in this analysis with a coefficient of -13.91.  The R-squared value of .697 illustrates that 
the independent variables in this regression model are an imposing predictor of states’ 
disapproval ratings of their state legislatures.  As expected states with term limit 
legislation are less likely than states without term limits to disapprove of their state 
legislatures.  Holding all independent variables at their mean, states with term limits are 
nearly 14% less likely to disapprove of their legislature than are states without term 
limits.  While no direction of causality was predicted for in session, its negative 
coefficient was noteworthy.  If a legislature is in session states are 2.7% less likely to 
disapprove of it.     
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Table 2.  Summary of Linear Regression Results 
              Disapproval Ratings of State Legislatures 
  R-Sq. = .697     
    Robust   
 
Coefficient S.E.   
Term limits -13.911*** 1.830   
Professionalism 43.257*** 6.227   
Unemployment 2.746*** 0.407   
Divided Government -4.264** 1.145   
In Session -2.773* 1.422   
State Party ID -.344* 0.117   
Constant 32.764*** 3.278   
        
260 Observations, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
  
The significance of these findings established a foundation for additional analyses of term 
limits and approval and disapproval ratings.  Many scholars (Lazarus, 2006; Powell, 
2000; and Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell, 2004, et al.) have conducted scholarly research 
analyzing the career paths of legislators in term limited and non-term limited states.  
They have found that the turnover rate is not as great as previously predicted.  If turnover 
in state legislatures is not as significant as predicted and the research presented here 
clearly demonstrates that term limits are a statistically significant predictor of approval 
ratings, could it be certain types of term limits lead to higher approval and lower 
disapproval ratings?  The data obtained from the National Conference of State Legislators 
contained information that allowed for the recoding of the term limit variable.  The first 
new variable, TConn was used to measure if a state had consecutive term limits, and the 
second new variable LConn, measured if a State had lifetime term limits, each variable 
was coded 1 for yes and 0 for no.  With these newly created variables, two new 
hypotheses can be tested.  The expectation is that legislators in states with consecutive 
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term limit legislation should be more in tune not only with the desires of their own 
constituents but with the desires of other constituencies as well.  The reasoning for this 
idea was that career politicians who may have to seek another office after a consecutive 
ban might find him/her self relying on these other constituencies for an election victory.  
A politician with a lifetime ban will not be as responsive to his/her constituents as well as 
other districts constituents because they are not concerned with re-election.  Politicians 
who are concerned with a larger group of constituents, not only their own, should make 
policy decisions that result in higher approval ratings of state legislatures. 
 Hypothesis 3: 
            States with consecutive term limit legislation for their state legislature will have 
higher approval ratings of their state legislatures than will states with lifetime term limits. 
Table 3.  Summary of Linear Regression Results 
                   Approval Ratings of State Legislatures   
  R-Sq. = .673     
    Robust   
  Coefficient S.E.   
Consecutive T.L. 9.340*** 1.593   
Lifetime T.L 6.307 6.020   
Professionalism -27.720* 11.767   
Unemployment -1.903*** 0.320   
Divided Government 2.690* .893   
In Session 0.007 1.003   
State Party ID 0.194 0.113   
Constant 45.688*** 3.876   
        
260 Observations *p<.05, **p<.01, 
***p<.001   
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 Hypothesis 4: 
            States with consecutive term limit legislation for their state legislature will have 
lower disapproval ratings of their state legislatures than states with lifetime term limits.  
Table 4.  Summary of Linear Regression Results 
                   Disapproval Ratings of State Legislatures   
  R-Sq. = .698     
    Robust   
  Coefficient S.E.   
Consecutive T.L. -14.000*** 1.884   
Lifetime T.L -10.668 7.645   
Professionalism 38.567* 13.624   
Unemployment 2.684*** 0.487   
Divided Government -4.090*** 1.182   
In Session -2.538 1.380   
State Party ID -0.308 0.143   
Constant 33.785*** 5.049   
        
260 Observations *p<.05, **p<.01, 
***p<.001   
  
Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate these hypotheses to be accurate.  In this analysis consecutive 
term limits are the most statistically significant of all three types of term limits analyzed.  
In Tables 3 and 4 lifetime term limits do not meet the standard for statistical significance  
The R-Squared value in Table 4 is the highest of all four regression models indicating 
that states with consecutive term limits are less likely to disapprove of their state 
legislature than are states with either no term limits or states with lifetime bans.  The 
coefficients for consecutive term limits in Tables 3 and 4 are larger than the coefficients 
are for term limits in Tables 1 and 2 respectfully.     
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Conclusion 
The analysis of the data presented in this paper should be good news for 
advocates of term limit legislation and political scientists.  Advocates adhering to term 
limit progressivism who acknowledged the failures of professional legislatures may have 
something to cheer about.  The initiation of term limits, especially consecutive term 
limits appears to be associated with higher approval and lower disapproval ratings.     
Term-limit populism aspired to replace long serving legislators with more 
responsive “ordinary citizens”.  Scholarly research has shown that even with term limit 
legislation many politicians are simply moving through different political offices 
(Lazarus, 2006; Powell, 2000; and Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell, 2004).  The data 
presented here clearly shows that term limit legislation is associated with higher approval 
ratings of state legislatures.  Term-limit populists might not have achieved their desired 
effect of removing long serving legislators; but if approval ratings are an indication, they 
are achieving their desired goal of more responsive government.   
Term-limit republicanism advocated term limits to eliminate careerism thus 
eliminating the need for re-election and enabling legislators to enact better policies.  
Term limit republicans consider term limits essential in the transformation of legislators 
into “trustees” insulated from public demands, elites, and special interests.  Term limits 
have not eliminated careerism or the need for re-election, but may have induced 
politicians to enact better policies in the hopes of being elected to another political office.  
A career in politics in a term limited state now requires legislators to enact policies that 
will not offend constituents in other districts or constituents who place more value on 
other political roles, which is not necessarily the case in non-term limited states.   
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Term Limit Libertarians who see term limits as only one step in the downsizing of 
government appear to be the single group who has not achieved their end goal.   
According to Lazarus (2011) “Term limit advocates have been partially, but not 
completely successful in their stated goal of removing careerist politicians from state 
legislatures.  While term limits certainly do stop a legislator from seeking re-election to a 
seat after a specified number of terms, I find that those that wish to pursue a long-term 
political career are not, in general stopped by term limits.” The advocates of term limits 
who saw them as a “cure all” for government by removing long serving legislators and 
isolating legislators from public demands might have solved the problem of 
unresponsive, degenerated State government without the removal of long serving 
legislators.  The unintended result of term limit legislation appears to induce career 
politicians to be more responsive to their constituents as well as other constituents; thus 
generating higher approval ratings for the legislature as a whole.   
The findings in this study demonstrate that in the eleven states analyzed, states 
with term limit legislation in place have higher approval ratings and lower disapproval 
ratings of their legislatures than do states without term limit legislation in place.  
Furthermore the data demonstrates that consecutive bans are superior to lifetime bans in 
that these bans are associated with even higher levels of public support.  There is a 
potential weakness of the consecutive vs. lifetime bans results in this study, because 
California was the only state analyzed with lifetime bans.  Still the robust results of this 
study should be encouragement for additional scholars to supplement the hypotheses 
developed for this project by furthering the study of state legislature approval ratings and 
term limit legislation.    
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Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
   States’ Term Limit Status and Cases Analyzed  
  
Term 
Limit No. of  Span of 
State Status Cases Cases 
California lb 17 3/2010-7/2011 
Connecticut ntl 18 7/2003-4/2012 
Florida cb 38 6/2004-1/2012 
Kansas ntl 17 3/2010-7/2011 
New Jersey ntl 57 4/2003-11/2011 
New York ntl 40 6/2004-2/2012 
Ohio cb 21 12/2006-2/2012 
Oregon rc 17 3/2010-7/2011 
Pennsylvania ntl 21 12/2006-3/2012 
Virginia ntl 6 6/2011-3/2012 
Washington rc 17 3/2010-7/2011 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 S
tP
ty
Id
  
  
 1
.0
00
0
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
St
Pt
yI
d
  
  
 S
tP
ty
Id
  
  
 0
.1
11
8 
 -
0.
25
54
  
 0
.2
74
7 
 -
0.
20
22
  
 0
.4
19
3 
 -
0.
05
28
  
 0
.1
69
5 
  
0.
06
22
  
 0
.9
29
5 
 -
0.
92
02
  
  
  
  
 R
ep
  
  
 0
.1
24
0 
  
0.
33
69
  
-0
.2
68
7 
 -
0.
09
75
  
-0
.3
71
4 
  
0.
01
97
  
-0
.1
17
9 
 -
0.
05
58
  
-0
.7
11
0 
  
1.
00
00
  
  
  
  
 D
em
  
  
 0
.3
17
8 
 -
0.
14
15
  
 0
.2
40
3 
 -
0.
45
52
  
 0
.4
03
3 
 -
0.
07
63
  
 0
.1
93
5 
  
0.
05
91
  
 1
.0
00
0
  
  
 D
iv
Le
gG
  
  
 0
.0
89
2 
 -
0.
18
78
  
 0
.2
69
6 
 -
0.
02
82
  
 0
.2
80
5 
  
0.
91
56
  
 0
.9
11
4 
  
1.
00
00
  
  
  
Di
vL
eg
  
  
 0
.1
52
0 
 -
0.
17
73
  
 0
.2
68
1 
 -
0.
11
22
  
 0
.3
31
5 
  
0.
68
55
  
 1
.0
00
0
  
  
  
Di
vG
ov
  
  
 0
.0
00
8 
 -
0.
16
11
  
 0
.2
51
8 
  
0.
05
50
  
 0
.1
87
9 
  
1.
00
00
  
  
  
In
Se
ss
  
  
 0
.0
78
1 
 -
0.
32
08
  
 0
.1
94
7 
 -
0.
24
56
  
 1
.0
00
0
  
  
 U
nE
mR
at
  
  
-0
.6
47
8 
  
0.
15
92
  
 0
.2
08
1 
  
1.
00
00
  
  
  
Pr
of
es
  
  
-0
.3
68
4 
  
0.
21
84
  
 1
.0
00
0
  
  
  
  
Te
rm
  
  
 0
.1
56
8 
  
1.
00
00
  
  
  
 A
Ra
te
  
  
 1
.0
00
0
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
AR
at
e 
  
  
Te
rm
  
 P
ro
fe
s 
 U
nE
mR
at
  
 I
nS
es
s 
  
Di
vG
ov
  
 D
iv
Le
g 
 D
iv
Le
gG
  
  
  
De
m 
  
  
 R
ep
(o
bs
=2
60
)
. 
co
rr
el
at
e 
AR
at
e 
Te
rm
 P
ro
fe
s 
Un
Em
Ra
t 
In
Se
ss
 D
iv
Go
v 
Di
vL
eg
 D
iv
Le
gG
 D
em
 R
ep
 S
tP
ty
Id
38 
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